Oidipous, Iokaste, and the audience all now learn from the Corinthian that he was with Polybos’s sheep in the high-mountain grazing lands when he received into his care an infant that had been bound with a thong passed not around, but through his ankles, which were pierced to receive it. The Corinthian describes the hobbling in terms (ποδῶν ἂν ἄρθρα μαρτυρήσειεν τὰ σά) similar to those used earlier by Iokaste to describe what was done to her child (νιν ἄρθρα κεῖνος ἐνζεύξας ποδοῖν; l. 718). The two statements are joined by the word for joints: ἄρθρα. The Corinthian’s testimony thus links the circumstances in which he received Oidipous into his care with those under which Iokaste’s infant son was set out to die (ll. 717-19); it makes the two narratives to be two tellings of the same story. The only difference between the two accounts is that of perspective. Where Iokaste uses the third person pronoun νιν, the Corinthian uses the second-person singular possessive adjective: τὰ σά. These pronouns refer to Oidipous at different stages of his life: infancy and manhood. The temporal aspect yokes the riddle of Oidipous’s identity to the Sphinx’s riddle, which seems to be written over the two foot-maiming narratives, which makes it apparent that Oidipous represents an exception to the riddle’s sollution, for as an infant he did not “go on four” but on three, since the thong made one limb of two. As a man in his prime he walked (by his own account) with a stick, so again he went “on three.” Even now the scars linking him to the infant bear witness to Laios’ and Iokaste’s intent to escape the punishment promised by the god for their disobedience. Thus, the Corinthian’s present testimony converges with the prophecy given Laios, the prophecy given Oidipous, Oidipous’s scars, and the Sphinx’s riddle. Just as the convergence of three cart tracks caused Oidipous to recognize the convergence of the story of Laios’ death with his own memory, the convergence revealed by the Corinthian’s testimony allows the audience to solve all the remaining riddles and understand the connections among them: a god is author of all prophecies pertaining to Laios, Iokaste, and Oidipous; the Sphinx’s riddle is also of divine origin and suited to Oidipous like the prophecies; the god can therefore be presumed to have inserted the Sphinx into Thebes in order to put Laios on the road to Delphi at the precise moment when he might encounter and be killed by his son; the Corinthian was posted at the right place and time in the wilderness of Kithairon to rescue the maimed infant; and he has now appeared in Thebes at the precise moment for his testimony to enable Oidipous to understand all the significant relationships of which he has been ignorant. It can therefore be supposed that Apollo orchestrated the Corinthian’s presence. Finally, since the audience knows that Laios’ death was necessitated by his own decision to ignore the god’s instructions prohibiting intercourse with Iokaste, the super-convergence of narratives, prophecies, and signs suggests that Oidipous’s imminent destruction is similarly necessitated by his decision to thwart the god’s instruction requiring him to take Laios’ life. The audience is now in a position to see that the god has employed the prophecies, the Sphinx, the Corinthian, Laios, and Oidipous to effect down to the last detail a brilliantly-conceived plan that has taken decades to reach its full expression. It should now be impossible for either Oidipous or Iokaste not to recognize that they are mother and son. That neither flinches or expostulates must dumbfound the audience: can these people really be so blind? [Apa] [Mp]