Here is another intriguing ambiguity; the accusative ἐμέ could serve as either subject or object (“I/me”) of the infinitive ἰδεῖν (to see). Thus, while Oidipous must mean: “so that I might see him,” the phrasing suggests rather the reverse: “so that he might see me.” [Gd] Like the sole survivor who requested to be posted as far out of sight of the town as possible, Laios’ herdsman (these two will soon prove to be one and the same person) may not wish to see Oidipous, and for the same reasons, for if the man in question discovers that the baby boy he saved from a cruel death survived, returned to Thebes, and married his mother, he would not wish to look upon it. [Md] It would be understandable if he were to flee in horror at what he had done. Oidipous should also be expected to recoil in horror from what he has done, and that he does not recoil from Iokaste presently standing beside him shows that he does not yet “see” who she is to him. This gives another meaning to his comment, “in order that I might see,” for the Theban shepherd’s presence will be required if Oidipous is ever to be made to see what he has done. If, on the other hand, ἐμέ (“I”) is taken to be the subject of this clause as Oidipous intends, it has no stated object. This leaves it open to mean, “that I might see.” The full expression of the question might have been, “Has Laios’ herdsman been kept alive so that I might see who I am and what I have done?” This interpretation emphasizes the god’s capacity to preserve and extend mortals’ lives in accordance with his needs. [Dn] Indeed, the needs imposed on him by his status as a divinity required him to save Oidipous. To the extent that the ambiguities of the preceding lines have brough the god vividly into the audience’s picture of events, it realizes that Apollo is alive, able to see Oidipous, able to judge him, and able to act upon that judgment. [Ap]