The deeds said by the palace staffperson to be worst are “willed and not unwilled.” The “polar expression” sounds unnecessarily verbose; like a riddle, it draws an investigation into what appears to be a meaningless distinction. The palace staffperson can only be supposed with both terms to be referring to Iokaste’s suicide and whatever harm Oidipous may have done to himself after he went into the palace, but the pairing begs to be applied on a wider scale. What it might mean has been suggested by the previous use of the word ἄκονθ᾽, heard in the first line of the last choral song, when the Chorus referred to Oidipous as “unwilling” (l. 1215), by which the audience understood: unwilling to kill his father despite an explicit claim of willingness at ll. 76-7 to do whatever the god should require. Thus, when the Chorus used the word “unwilling” at l. 1215, it evoked its opposite: willing. The polarity willing/unwilling focuses attention on the contradiction between the claim willingly to serve the god and the actual fact of unwillingness to serve the god whenever the mandated action is unacceptable to the city or its ruler. The “evils” mentioned by the staffperson seem to result from an ambivalence towards Apollo in which Iokaste and Oidipous share. The evils to be expunged from Thebes also stem from actions predicated upon the couple’s contradictory responses to prophecy. The city’s cleansing can commence, then, only with a proper understanding of the relationship between what is willed, what is unwilled, and what is not unwilled. Oidipous serves as the example; he was never willing to kill his father; he was, however, not unwilling to kill him when he did not recognize him as his father, and he was absolutely unwilling to kill him when he heard from the god that it was necessary for him to perform that deed. Due to Oidipous’s unwillingness, Apollo was compelled organize circumstances for him to do what he was not unwilling to do. The meeting at the crossroads allowed Oidipous the freedom to do what he was not unwilling to do, but his ignorance permitted him thereby also to do what he was unwilling to do. If Athens is unwilling to perform whatever action the god views as necessary, he can compel it to do so anyway, even against its will, by arranging for it to do what it is not unwilling to do because it is ignorant of the ramifications. Compliance with necessity occurs either way, willed or not. The difference between willing and unwilling compliance has no bearing upon performance or non-performance of the necessary action, it has to do with the subject’s relationship with Apollo. Willing compliance puts one in harmony with him, and this facilitates further communication and cooperation. Unwilling compliance puts one at odds with the god and impedes further communication and collaboration. The cleansing that may be required following a willing action is altogether different than the cleansing required following unwilling compliance, for cleansing after willing compliance brings the chain of necessary actions to an end, while unwilling compliance imposes upon the god the new necessity of making an ignominious example of the unwilling subject. When unwillingness persists, the god may be compelled to extend corrective intervention over time, even unto the next generation. [Md] [Apa] [Aj] [Dnc] [Dnp]