As he curses the shepherd who saved his life, Oidipous reveals to the audience that he still regards himself as a victim of circumstance. The audience will realize, however, that while Oidipous has no responsibility for what happened to him as a baby, the circumstances involved necessities to which even Apollo was subject, for the infant had to be preserved if he was to uphold the god’s prophetic word. Iokaste’s narrative makes it clear that the actions of both herdsmen fully accorded with a necessity that bore on Apollo. Cursing Apollo or any of his instruments, which include Oidipous, is therefore senseless; it amounts to cursing both the god and the necessity to which the god himself is subject. It was that necessity that Apollo appears to have attempted to communicate with Oidipous by summoning him to Delphi through the drunkard’s comment. Oidipous’s curse bears more meaningfully on himself and his failure to respect the words of the Pythia sufficiently to seek confirmation that he was interpreting them correctly. The curse invites the audience to reassess the shepherd’s actions too. He was aware of the prophecies stipulating that any child born to Iokaste and Laios would take Laios’ life (ll. 1178 and 1180). If he took these prophecies seriously, he was bound to consider that killing the child would subvert prophecy, and thus undermine the god’s authority, while saving the child would subvert the royals’ attempt to undermine the medium for communication between gods and mortals. Knowing this, saving the child rendered the shepherd a willing agent of divine action. The pain that action caused his masters has nevertheless made him wish he had died on that day (l. 1157). The audience can compare this wish with Oidipous’s similar wish that the shepherd had died before saving the infant. Where Oidipous’s wish entails failure of the god’s project and thus erosion of the medium for communication and cooperation between gods and mortals, the shepherd might suppose that his wish would only have spared him the pain of witnessing the unhappy consequences of his service to the god. What he appears not to realize is that Apollo could not have granted even that wish, for had the shepherd died, he would not presently be available to provide his testimony. Oidipous’s present wish suggests that, regardless of his declarations to the contrary, when push comes to shove (as it did at the crossroads) he will act first and foremost on his own behalf. He still believes, as he always has, that his action offers the best solution to any problem. Even now, when it is evident that he does not possess the power to enforce his own will, he still imagines that he has the capacity to give and take life, as if he were himself a god. Apollo is not that kind of god; his power is not arbitrary, but constrained by the necessity of upholding his own prophetic word, without which he cannot be of service to mortals. From the audience’s vantage, the shepherd must bear the pain of his participation in Apollo’s project, for upon it rests the future of the relationship between gods and mortals. Thus, whether the shepherd was motivated by piety or compassion makes no difference, for in his action the two converge. Genuine compassion for human beings insists upon securing for them the benefit of divine perspicacity. [Md] [Mi] [Mw] [Ap] [Dnp] Human standards of moral conduct and Apollo’s will are in this instance fully compatible; divine justice is perfectly rational and comprehensible. Oidipous’s judgment, by contrast, is often out of keeping with both divine and human values. [Mpe] He consequently cannot appreciate the risk the shepherd took on behalf both of the innocent child and the powerful god. Even worse, he still has no sense of the constraints affecting mortals and gods alike. Blind to the possibility of a divine plan, he remains completely ignorant of its implications. His cursing the shepherd is emblematic of his ignorance, for he arrogates to himself a god’s capacity for judgment and the power to execute it. He regards all beings, gods included, as instruments of his own will. He fails to see that this arrogance has called down upon himself the curse whose effect he has now begun to feel. [Mw] That curse not only pollutes the one who invokes it, but it affects those whose services the god must then suborn in order to purge the pollution. Oidipous has himself been in both roles: he was required to kill Laios in service of the god, and his refusal to cooperate in this action in turned required that service be demanded of others. [Dnc] [P]