Oidipous seems to be making a declaration about what it is not possible to say (οὐ γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἔσθ᾽), namely: things that one should not or cannot do well or properly (καλόν). He appears to be citing an adage to the effect that words are only valid when matched by deeds, by which he would mean that he finds it necessary to carry into action the threats he made at the beginning of the play. His formulation of this adage is problematized, however, in several ways, which will prompt the audience to think more carefully about this statement. First, the main clause makes it seem as though Oidipous is claiming that some declarations are impossible to make. Which, if any, might these be? One could think of the preceding sentence, which is exceedingly convoluted due to the thatch of improper relations that it tries to name. The actions of Laios, Iokaste, and Oidipous have jumbled categories like “fathers, siblings, children” and “brides, wives, and mothers.” This the resulting confusion has made it impossible to “call them by their right names” (αὐδᾶν). The following clause refers to action, but in a general sense: “things which not to do is good.” Vast is the category of things that it is good not to do. The first example likely to spring to the audience’s mind, especially following the confusion of familial relationships to which Oidipous has just tried to give expression in the preceding sentence, might well be that it would have been good for Laios not to have had intercourse with his wife once it had been forbidden by Apollo. It would also have been good for Laios and Iokaste not to attempt to protect themselves from the consequenes of their impiety by taking the life of their innocent child. [P] (They might have done better to throw themselves on Apollo’s mercy by making a clean breast of it and asking the god for direction, what they might do to atone for it.) [Mip] It certainly would have been good for their child, Oidipous, whom Apollo had spared, raised, and brought to Delphi for instruction, not to run from that instruction, even if the thought of drawing his father’s blood was utterly abhorrent to him. [Md] This message makes sense, but not coming from Oidipous, whose speech just a moment before was indicative of a profoundly confused state of mind. It would not be surprising, however, to hear a general statement of such profundity coming from Apollo. [Gd] Indeed, once one regards Oidipous’s language as a vehicle for divine communication, it can be reinterpreted in yet another way: “It is not good/right/proper for me [Apollo] to give voice to things that it is not possible to do.” Is it ever impossible to declare something good and then not do it? Of course it is; men can say anything. As Apollo has just gone to very great lengths to demonstrate, however, a god cannot make an utterance without seeing it through to realization. Divine utterances must be matched by deeds if they are to have any force and if their intermediaries are to command any respect. [Dnp] [Dnc] Furthermore, it appears to be the case that it is not possible for a god to instruct a mortal to do something that it is not good for the mortal to carry out; the projects in which the gods enlist mortal participation are just. [Ad] [Aj] This gives an altogether new meaning to the old adage that words should be matched by deeds. [Mpea]