Kreon explains that he would already have done exactly as Oidipous requests, and that he does not do so now is because he has been necessitated (ἔχρῃζον) first to learn from the god precisely (ἐκμαθεῖν) what must be done (τί πρακτέον). Yet Kreon has already gone in person to ask the god precisely this question, to which he received the answer: “to banish or loose murder back on murder” (ll. 100-1). Why, then, does he insist upon a further consultation? Is he buying time? Is he afraid to act? Or, now that the culprit has been identified as his ruler, nephew, and brother-in-law, does he find the burden of deciding between the two punishments to lie beyond his capacity? If he feels this to be the case, then perhaps he believes that he must return to Delphi (or have someone go in his stead) to ask a question that he could have asked when there but did not because he failed to anticipate the difficulty in which he would find himself. This points up the fact that when Oidipous consulted with the god he can be presumed never to have asked, “What must be done?” The god told him that anyway, using language like that now used by Kreon: it was necessary (χρῆναι) that he draw his father’s blood with his own hands (ll. 995-6). Oidipous did not go to Delphi for instructions, what to do, but for information, who his parents were. Yet, from the god’s reply to him, we can infer that Apollo’s intent is to affect mortal action. Even when one asks for information, it should be presumed that the information will inform action, as in fact it did in Oidipous’s case. Based on what he thought he understood, he decided forever more to steer clear of Corinth. Kreon understands not only that consultation bears on action, but his insistence on returning to Delphi for clarification suggests that the consultation must yield precision sufficient to carry out the instructions without ambiguity, and such precision is clearly a matter of the consulter’s judgment. The decision to consult always presumes an insufficiently precise understanding, what to do in a given circumstance. In situations where one believes one knows precisely what to do, one may proceed to do it, and satisfactory results will confirm that judgment. When the situation does not respond well to one’s actions, on the other hand, one may presume that one’s understanding is insufficient, and then one has recourse to Delphi. If one consults and then runs into the need to make a decision not resolved by the consultation, then one is obliged to return for another consultation. Kreon was satisfied to end his Delphic consultation without clarifying which of the two punishments he should choose. Indeed, he could not anticipate that that decision would be his to make. Now, with the city still infected by plague and Oidipous having removed himself from power, Kreon realizes that his consultation fell short. It is his judgment not to risk making matters worse by acting on incomplete instructions. [Mipd] [Mw] [Mg]