Oidipous seems to hit upon the truth when he points out that the god was unwilling to name Laios’ killer. The god may in fact have been unwilling to give the name, but he is clearly not unwilling to help Thebes address the problem of the plague. Therefore, rather than regarding the god’s apparent unwillingness as an indication that the gods are unconcerned, unwilling, or unable, one should anticipate that the god’s agenda may at times be opaque to mortals. What counts, then, is not mortal judgment of immortal willingness or mortal comprehension of immortal motivations or plans; rather, mortals are to do as Oidipous is now doing: follow the instructions that the god has given. It seems paradoxical, though, that Oidipous, the one who is apparently the primary object of the god’s displeasure, best understands the god in this regard, and contradictory or inconsistent that Oidipous, whose self-reliance seems at times boundless, here acknowledges a limit to mortal powers, particularly the strength to cross wills with a god. Indeed, while he expresses his view in the form of a gnomic statement meant to have universal validity, he is himself one man who has spent his adult life trying to compel a god; he has taken vigorous measures to evade the destiny foretold him by the Delphic Oracle. This again suggests that Oidipous would not in fact accept a prophetic statement identifying him as the source of Thebes’ pollution. The god’s insight is sufficiently subtle to know what will work and what will not, and so not to name Oidipous but rather set the wheels in motion for Oidipous to name himself. The hypocrisy stemming from the present contradiction between Oidipous’s word and deed reveals him, at the very moment when he appears to defer to the god’s powers and prerogatives, to be arrogant. [Md] [Mpe] [Ap] [Ad]