328.0

There are two ways to understand Teiresias’s comment that Oidipous and the Thebans all “think unclearly;” either Oidipous and the Thebans misunderstand the proper relationship between themselves and a prophet, before whom it is not proper for them to “fawn like dogs,” or they cannot accept that it is better for them to be denied the information they so desperately seek. If the former, the negated verb φρονέω associates fawning with a lack of thought, reflection, and understanding; it suggests that fawning is objectionable because it is based on a false conception of Teiresias’ss role vis-á-vis the god for whom he speaks, and thus a false understanding of the god’s relationship with mortals. [Mpea] [P] One who pleads or begs by cowering, whimpering, and licking the master’s feet believes himself or herself to be utterly dependent upon the superior’s good graces. If such obsequiousness is improper, as Teiresias might mean to indicate, its removal changes the exchange to a simple request for assistance. This implies that the person making the request intends to work to improve the situation. The god, then, is viewed in a supportive rather than dominant role. Teiresias’ss criticism suggests that anyone who either rejects prophecy or begs for it misses the middle path of reasoned, measured, sensible, balanced cooperation. [Dnc] But perhaps Teiresias means Oidipous to understand that it would be better for him not to receive the answer to the question he is presently posing. He should not be told that it was he who killed Laios, King of Thebes. Why would that be better? The gods are destined (by myth) to make the truth known, and what better way than through the offices of a seer? But the Pythia has already had the opportunity to do that, and she, like Teiresias, must have chosen not to. That both oracle and seer choose to withhold this information suggests that it is not a decision either of them made. This was Apollo’s decision. Teiresias’s use of the verb φρονέω seems to answer the question, why he will not divulge Laios’ killer, by characterizing Oidipous’s state of mind: he is not thinking clearly. Oidipous would not be receptive to the information the god could provide. Indeed, he has reacted very strongly–and perhaps unreasonably–to past prophecies. As the audience may already know (and will soon be reminded), Oidipous responded to the oracle’s revelation that he must kill his father by fleeing the sacred precinct. The audience might also recall the Athenian reaction to the report that the god has promised Sparta the victory in the present war with Athens, to which it has responded by deciding to win the war even without divine support. An Athenian victory thus would entail proving that the Delphic prophecy has no force. Delphi would lose its standing and could in future be ignored. Considering, however, the fact that it knows that Oidipous has already failed to cheat the prophecy that he must kill father and marry mother, the audience must consider that Athens, too, could well fail. Athens could lose to Sparta. A proper and more reasonable response to a seemingly unreasonable prophecy would be to regard the information communicated by Apollo as the starting point for a cooperative relationship between mortal and god. Rather than fleeing in horror from even the direst of divine pronouncements, the clear-thinking individual or city would seek Apollo’s guidance, what to do to make the best of the situation. [Mi] [Md]