Iokaste calls upon Oidipous to trust using the same word (πίστευσον) that he himself moments ago employed with Kreon (l. 625), but where Oidipous was asking Kreon to trust his word against that of the seer, Iokaste is asking Oidipous to trust in the sincerity of Kreon’s piety. At issue here seems to be the credibility of claims to piety. Both Kreon and Oidipous base their certitude on their own direct knowledge of what they have not done. The audience knows that Oidipous’s faith in the knowledge provided by his own experience proves to be unfounded. His error undermines the principle that knowledge based upon personal experience outweighs all other evidence, especially a seer’s clear declaration. Prophecy, towards which one might reasonably harbor some skepticism, proves in this instance to be more reliable than direct experience. Kreon’s certainty, on the other hand, is not false; he did not suborn the prophet. Nevertheless, his knowledge is also limited, for he cannot see the role that Apollo requires him to play. His urging Oidipous to consult Teiresias is innocent of the consultation’s consequences. His ignorance, then, which is based on trusting to the god to direct the plot, makes him useful to the god. Nor can the god’s motives be selfish, for Apollo cannot wish to sit upon Oidipous’s throne. Thus, where Oidipous supposes that he has discovered the commission of an injustice, the audience must suppose that it has discovered the commission of an act of justice administered by Apollo through the agency of his seer and the mortal who urged the consultation. What seems to have been made clear here is that, when a god is at work, mortals cannot rely entirely upon their own capacity either to plan their own action or to judge the action of others; for this one requires the help of a seer, and any mortal who urges consultation with a seer, endeavors to bring mortal action into harmony with a divinely-conceived plot line. [P] [Mi] [Mpe] [Apama]