From Iokaste’s mention of the fact that Laios acted “by others’ hands” (ἄλλων χερσὶν), Oidipous and the audience may infer that Laios believed he might thereby escape the pollution consequent upon his action. It would be absurd, however, for one who has decided to challenge prophecy to fear pollution. That absurdity is moreover nothing in comparison with the idea that one might escape the pollution of infanticide by choosing exposure as the method of death. Implicit to the idea of exposure is placement of the baby’s fate in the hands of the gods. In this case, Laios and Iokaste give Apollo the baby that Apollo instructed them not to conceive with the threat that, if conceived that baby would be born, if born that it would survive, and if it survived that Laios would die by its hand. If Laios had been at all minded to protect himself from the god’s wrath, he should not have disobeyed the god, and if he did disobey, he must not be so foolish as to flee the consequences. Once he decides to contest Apollo’s powers, he must stand against the god with all his might and without regard for pollution; he must destroy his infant child by his own hand, for the child’s death can be no more damaging to his relationship with the god than his decision to have intercourse with his wife despite the god’s explicit prohibition. The decision to kill his son in a manner that might deflect blame from himself through a kind of technicality demeans the god by attempting to make of him a dupe. The infant’s exposure purports to place his fate in the hands of nature. To the extent that the natural world is an expression of divine activity, placement of an infant in the wilderness places responsibility for its death in the lap of the gods. Exposure transfers moral responsibility for murder to the gods. The reasoning behind Laios’ action is therefore patently false; either the exposure of his infant son is murder as surely as if he had smashed the child’s head against a rock (as suggested by Iokaste’s language) or there is no need for human beings to trouble themselves about pollution through the killing of a relative. In presenting this story as evidence for her thesis that prophecy–and thus the gods–can be safely ignored, Iokaste shows her thinking to be as responsible for the pollution as the baby’s exposure and the couple’s prohibited intercourse. Oidipous’s survival shows that “chance” provides the gods with an opening to work “through others’ hands,” as Iokaste puts it, to punish and instruct mortals. When it comes to right and wrong or pious and impious behavior, chance plays no role. [P] [Aj] [Ad] [Dc]