813.0

The time elapsed between Oidipous’s first contact with Laios at the crossroads and Laios’ death cannot have been more than matter of seconds, possibly no longer than the time it takes Oidipous to narrate the action. In relation to the preceding passage of his narrative, however, this description moves as if in slow motion; it affords close scrutiny of every glance, expression, and blow. The audience is allowed to see how the horses pulling the car are driven straight towards Oidipous so that he is forced to jump aside; how, aggrieved by this disregard for his right to a share of the path, he strikes the driver; how in the next moment the vehicle’s passenger, a man getting on in years, watches for his opportunity and strikes back, bringing down on the wayfarer’s head the double-pointed cattle prod that he carries in his hand; and how, before the cart rolls out of reach, the “biped afoot on the road acting as the god’s accomplice” returns the old man’s blow with his staff, swinging hard enough to topple him out of the cart and onto his back. The narrative then passes over the crucial moment in which Oidipous takes his father’s life; the omission suggests that the other man’s death meant nothing to Oidipous. If audience wishes more detail, it must imagine for itself how Laios landed on his back at Oidipous’s feet, how he would have been looking up at him when the young man drew his edged weapon and killed him, and how he then killed the rest of the traveling party. Oidipous deals death lightly and, despite the awful prophecy from which he is in flight, he remains oblivious to any possible implications of killing, whether one man or several. He does however comment that the price the old man paid was more than he owed. This invites the audience to judge the act of justice for itself, and it will find that both men resort to violence when given even modest provocation, both respond with more violence than the circumstances require, and both contribute to the rage (ὀργή) that results in massacre. It will likely question, however, whether the offense committed against Oidipous first by the driver, then by Laios at the crossroads does not merit death. What he did to the infant Oidipous is less questionable; attempted infanticide seems better to justify parricide. But far more clear than either crime against the person of Oidipous is the fact that Laios’ death accords with the consequences promised by the prophecy that he chose to ignore. In this respect, Oidipous is not the injured party, and so it is not Oidipous who requires Laios’ death but the god Apollo, the crime against whom is defined by the couple’s disregard for his prohibition on intercourse, which was clearly conveyed to them through prophecy. Apollo demanded of them that they sacrifice the customary rights, priveleges, and pleasures of marriage as a demonstration of their obedience to himself and of their respect for prophecy as the medium for communication between them. When they declined to make this sacrifice and the demonstration it represented, they affronted Apollo, obliging him to act, which he does by making Oidipous his instrument. That it is their impiety for which justice is exacted signals that the god regards obedience to him and respect for the medium of communication between him and mortals as necessary; it is the foundation for their relationship. [Aj] [P] [Dnp] [Dnc]