Iokaste’s construction, which is subordinated to the verb χρῆναι (“to be necessary”), suggests that the prophecy conveyed the idea of necessity. This stands out because when Iokaste related the same prophecy earlier, she expressed it in different terms; “fate (μοῖρα) would come to him to die by a child’s hand, / One who might issue forth from me and him” (ll. 713-14). Fate and necessity are not one and the same thing. The discrepancy raises questions about the accuracy of Iokaste’s account and draws the audience’s attention to the god’s precise meaning. Telling the prophecy differently suggests that Iokaste sees no difference between fate and necessity. Her account also elides the fact (assuming from Aeschylus’s version that it was one) that the god prohibited intercourse between her and Laios. According to Aeschylus’s version of the prophecy, Laios’ death was a consequence of his disobedience. He was not fated to die at his son’s hands because he could avoid intercourse with Iokaste That the god was instructing Laios to refrain from intercourse suggests that he had the power to do as he chose. When he chose intercourse, he imposed a necessity on Apollo, if Apollo’s prophetic word was to carry any weight, to arrange for Laios to be killed by his child. Had Apollo said “fate,” it would have indicated that he was informing the couple that their future was set and could not be changed. In that case, there was no point to the communication. The idea of “fate” makes the god’s communication—and a fortoriori the god himself—irrelevant. “Necessity” signifies that the god’s failure to follow through will have unavoidable consequences for the god, which by extension means unavoidable consequences for the couple, for if the god is compelled to see to Laios’ killing by the son conceived with and born to Iokaste, this will have a direct affect on them. By informing the couple of the consequences of their actions, the god exposes himself to that compulsion. By disobeying, the couple subject Apollo to the compulsion he has foreseen; they force him to make good on his word. Thus, the expression of “necessity” makes of the god a potential friend and ally to mortals, but not a protector, for not only can he not save them from themselves, by venturing to guide them he subjects himself to a necessity with which he may not find it easy to comply. In order to help mortals, Apollo takes a risk. If mortals accept his help, the risk is removed for him and their wellbeing is enhanced. If mortals abuse the offer of help, the risk places the god under an obligation to take corrective action that will seriously degrade the mortals’ wellbeing. Meaningful interaction between gods and mortals cannot avoid these entailments; it subjects both to a greater necessity. Iokaste misses this connection altogether, for she rejects (as did Laios, as does Oidipous, and as does Athens) out of hand the proposition that she accept subjection to any compulsion whatsoever. [Dnc] [Dnp] [Md]