Iokaste probably means that Polybos died an ordinary death, which is the case, but she takes that death to be a proof that Oidipous had no need to worry himself with the prophecy that he would kill his father, and that is not the case. If “fate” is understood to mean “divine action,” it may have had nothing to do with Polybos’s death, unless one cannot ignore its hugely coincidental timing, which brought the messenger carrying news of Laios’ death to Oidipous at the precise moment when Iokaste had prayed for divine intervention to soothe her husband’s mind. And despite the appearance that Laios’ death was a chance event, fate also seems to have been at play in it, because it fulfilled numerous prophecies. Thus, where τύχη can mean either “divine action” or “chance,” these alternatives do not here represent an ambiguity; they suggest rather that the same event may appear to result either from divine action or from chance depending on the viewer’s perspective. Chance, it would seem, is an aspect of circumstances viewed without the benefit of divine insight afforded by prophecy. Fate or divine action, on the other hand, is an aspect of circumstances described by divine speech in advance of their occurrence. The notion of “fate,” then depends upon the assumption that both prophetic speech and those circumstances upon which it touches both stem from divine power. [Mpea] [Mpei] [Dc] [Apcma] [Apa]