This is the second account Oidipous has given of the prophecy. Though shorter than the first, which seemed to make a prediction about the future (“he said that I would be my birth father’s murderer”), it is richly ambiguous. To begin with, the verb changes from the future optative of the verb to be to the imperpfect indicative of a verb that can mean “I was about to” (ἔμελλον). Did the god say, “you will be your birth father’s murderer” or did he say, “you are about to kill your father”? Did he use the term “birth father” or not? Did he make one statement or two? If the word was in fact ἔμελλον, Apollo seems to have been warning him that the encounter was imminent. If that were so, even more importance should have been given to any killing that might occur immediately after leaving Delphi. The more time that passed after that, the less likely the victim was to be Oidipous’s father. One can, however, interpret the verb in other ways: “I was destined to,” “I was likely to,” or “I was delaying.” Each of these interpretations suggests the opportunity for a philosophically rich and practically significant exchange with the god. Was the god imparting dispiriting knowledge that implied his own cruelty? Was he maiking a prediction based on perception and assessment of factors unseen by Oidipous, but possible to avert if ge had a better understanding? Or was he making an observation about Oidipous’s disposition to act based upon an accurate knowledge of his character? Each of these interpretations is an invitation to further exploration of what the god is trying to say, yet having already been told that Oidipous fled Delphi immediately upon receiving this prophecy, the audience knows that he failed to appreciate or take advantage of the opportunity for further questions afforded him by the prophetic institution. Flight was from this perspective alone a poor response; it deprived Oidipous of the opportunity to learn something profoundly important about himself, his family, his gods, and the universe in which all parties must coexist and interact. The audience can, however, try its own exploration of the questions raised. It can see, for example, that the god knows Oidipous well, for when he was at Delphi he was about to try to delay or altogether avoid killing his father. Based on Apollo’s knowledge of his character, he knew he was likely to kill his father. Perhaps he knew that Laios was on his way to Delphi and that Oidipous was likely to react to the prophecy by turning his back on Corinth and hastening in the opposite direction. Perhaps the god knew that when they met, the two men were likely quickly to become embroiled in a conflict that was likely to escalate to violence. If all this was so, then the god could achieve his purpose by either of two means: either by allowing the predictable to happen or by warning Oidipous what was likely to happen if he resisted and thereby obtaining his willing participation in Laios’ death. Both responses serve the god’s purpose, but his warning suggests that he prefers Oidipous to kill his father in compliance with prophecy rather than resistance to it. The god may also have been correctly understood to refer to destiny, for he may have foreknowledge of things the must come, whether one likes it or not. Finally, if the god does have foresight, he would know that Oidipous is indeed about to kill his father. The interpretations are not mutually exclusive; they complement one another. Apollo is able to make good use of every nuance, every element of ambiguity, just as he is able to realize his project by a variety of possible approaches. [Mpea] [Mi] [Ad] [Apc] [Apa] [Da]